If Prime Minister Manmohan Singh decides to go to Washington, he must take with him a clear set of proposals for dealing with the crisis and aimed at bringing about a reconfiguration of the governance structure of these bodies. Everyone agrees that the Bretton Woods institutions have performed miserably in the run-up to the crisis. But the crisis was not simply a failure of supervision on their part. It was a logical outcome of the mother of all moral hazards caused by the power of seignorage enjoyed by the United States since World War II and especially since the 1970s when the heyday of the dollar began in earnest. Simply put, the U.S. was able to live on a perpetual debt cycle secure in the knowledge that its economy would not be pauperised by the inevitable crash in the same way as the economies of Argentina or South East Asia were in the 1990s because its national money serves as the international reserve currency and will never be allowed to lose too much value. During the Asia-Europe Meeting in Beijing last week, there was an acute awareness of the burden of adjustment being cast on other big economies such as China, Japan, India, Korea, and Europe. To the extent to which globalisation has linked the fate of all economies, a certain amount of burden-sharing is inevitable. But India must ensure that the G-20 comes up with a balanced set of proposals that will include the right mix of emergency financial measures as well as long-term structural changes. Above all, New Delhi must closely consult with Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Paris so that Asia and Europe speak with one voice on November 15.
Sunday, November 2, 2008
Asia and the financial crisis
If Prime Minister Manmohan Singh decides to go to Washington, he must take with him a clear set of proposals for dealing with the crisis and aimed at bringing about a reconfiguration of the governance structure of these bodies. Everyone agrees that the Bretton Woods institutions have performed miserably in the run-up to the crisis. But the crisis was not simply a failure of supervision on their part. It was a logical outcome of the mother of all moral hazards caused by the power of seignorage enjoyed by the United States since World War II and especially since the 1970s when the heyday of the dollar began in earnest. Simply put, the U.S. was able to live on a perpetual debt cycle secure in the knowledge that its economy would not be pauperised by the inevitable crash in the same way as the economies of Argentina or South East Asia were in the 1990s because its national money serves as the international reserve currency and will never be allowed to lose too much value. During the Asia-Europe Meeting in Beijing last week, there was an acute awareness of the burden of adjustment being cast on other big economies such as China, Japan, India, Korea, and Europe. To the extent to which globalisation has linked the fate of all economies, a certain amount of burden-sharing is inevitable. But India must ensure that the G-20 comes up with a balanced set of proposals that will include the right mix of emergency financial measures as well as long-term structural changes. Above all, New Delhi must closely consult with Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Paris so that Asia and Europe speak with one voice on November 15.
Labels:
Asia,
Financial crisis,
G-20,
G-8,
India,
international financial crisis
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment